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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION! 
The d e c i s i o n of t h e H o n o r a b l e Boyd L. P |ark , D i s t r i c t J u d g e , 
F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t of U t a h C o u r i t y , w a s r e d u c e d t o 
j u d g m e n t a n d e n t e r e d J u n e 2 3 , 1 9 8 7 . (R. 313)| P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l e d 
t o t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t on J u l y 2 3 ,f 1 9 8 7 . ( R . 3 1 7 ) 
T h e r e a f t e r , on A u g u s t 6 , 1 9 8 7 , D e f e n d a n t , R o c k y M o u n t a i n 
H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . , f i l e d i t s N o t i c e o f C r o s s A p p e a l . ( R . 5 6 8 ) 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e (Supreme C o u r t of t h e 
S t a t e of U t a h , t h i s c a s e was p o u r e d - o v e r t o t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s 
f o r d i s p o s i t i o n on o r a b o u t N o v e m b e r 6 , 1 9 8 7 . N o t i c e of t h e 
p o u r i n g - o v e r was g i v e n by l e t t e r of t h e s a ^ e d a t e , a t r u e a n d 
c o r r e c t c o p y of w h i c h i s a t t a c h e d a s an a d d e n d u m h e r e t o and 
i n c o r p o r a t e d b y r e f e r e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s S t a t e m e n t o f 
J u r i s d i c t i o n . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
i 
1. Is there sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
wrongful termination of an employment contract? 
2. Is there sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
monetary damages suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the alleged 
wrongful termination of the employment contract? 
3. Is there sufficient evidence to Support a finding that 
500 of the shares issued as part of Certificate No. 103 should 
appropriately be distinguished from the remaining 11,445 shares 
issued under the same certificate and returned to Plaintiff? 
4. Is there sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
Defendant, Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc,, or any of its agents 
o r o f f i c e r s p r e v e n t e d P l a i n t i f f f r o m p e r f o r m i n g u n d e r t h e 
c o n s u l t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t ? 
5 . I s i t a p p r o p r i a t e , u n d e r t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t o 
a s s u m e P l a i n t i f f c o u l d h a v e p e r f o r m e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r t h e 
c o n s u l t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t n e c e s s a r y t o p e r m i t h im t o o b t a i n , w i t h o u t 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , t h e d i s p u t e d s t o c k ? 
6 . I s D e f e n d a n t , R o c k y M o u n t a i n H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . , 
e n t i t l e d t o r e t u r n of t h e d i s p u t e d s h a r e s of s t o c k a s a m a t t e r 
l a w ? 
(a) Did P l a i n t i f f g i v e a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e 
d i s p u t e d s h a r e s ? 
(b) D i d P l a i n t i f f g i v e a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r 
Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s a l l e g e d r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of t h e r i g h t t o 
r e c a l l t h e s t o c k ? 
(c ) I s D e f e n d a n t e n t i t l e d t o r e t u r n of t h e s t o c k u n d e r 
t h e t e r m s of t h e c o n s u l t i n g and e s c r o w a g r e e m e n t s ? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
D e f e n d a n t , Rocky M o u n t a i n H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . i s u n a w a r e of 
a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , s t a t u t e s , o r d i n a n c e s , r u l e s , o r 
r e g u l a t i o n s w h o s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s d e t e r m i n a t i v e o f t h e 
f o r e g o i n g i s s u e s . 
INTRODUCTION 
D e f e n d a n t , E x e c u t i v e E s c r o w S e r v i c e s , h a s e s s e n t i a l l y b e e n 
d o r m a n t t h r o u g h o u t t h i s d i s p u t e . I t s i m p l y h o l d s s t o c k 
C e r t i f i c a t e N o . 1 0 3 a w a i t i n g t h e o r d e r of t h e c o u r t . As a 
result, all references to "Defendant" tased herein are to 
Defendant Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., except as otherwise 
stated. 
In the beginning, this was a dispute over 11,945 shares of 
stock of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., issued to Mr. Smith. 
Smith acknowledged as much in response to Defendant's first 
requests for admission stating "Plaintiff had reason to believe 
that Defendant would attempt to obtain Plaintiff's stock and only 
then took legal action to preclude Defendant from doing so." (R. 
50 emphasis added) 
Smith never intended to state a case of monetary recovery 
for himself based upon a contention of wrongful termination of 
the consulting arrangement. The evidence is clear Plaintiff 
never worked under the consulting arrangement and was to be paid 
only if he did. This proceeding was commenced simply to prevent 
Rocky Mountain from its "attempt to obtaini Plaintiff's stock." 
As a result the evidence relating to the nature of the 
"employment contract" is somewhat sparse. 
With the trial court's ruling, this appeal must now deal 
with issues concerning the existence of an employment contract 
and whether that contract was wrongfully terminated. While 
Defendant does not necessarily agree with tjihe legal reasoning of 
the trial court and some aspects of the ruling, it does believe 
the court attempted to rule equitably und^r the circumstances. 
Defendant was willing to abide by the ruling since it achieved 
what it intended to accomplish from the beginning, return of 
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(most of) its stock. 
Defendant's cross-appeal, challenges the trial court's 
ruling as it concerns the award of damages to Plaintiff and the 
order permitting Plaintiff to retain ownership of 500 shares of 
stock in Defendant, without restrictions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action to determine the disposition of 11,945 
shares of stock in Defendant Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., 
issued to Plaintiff during the time of his employment with 
Defendant. In addition, this case seeks to determine whether 
Plaintiff suffered damages resulting from termination of a 
consulting arrangement between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
In the trial court, Defendant took the position it was 
entitled to return of the stock as a matter of law. 
On three separate occasions, Defendant filed motions for 
partial summary judgment with respect to the disposition of the 
stock. (R. 80, 99, and 182) It was the belief of Defendant's 
counsel that following resolution of the stock dispute, the other 
disputes would quietly go away. 
Only two of the motions for summary judgment were heard and 
ruled upon by the court. (R. 153 & 231) Following Defendant's 
first filing of a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's 
counsel requested the opportunity to take the deposition of 
Defendant's president, James B. Burr. (R. 97) As a result, 
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hearing of the first motion was not scheduled. Following the 
taking of the deposition, Defendant submitted a second motion for 
partial summary judgment and a modified memorandum. Oral 
argument was requested. (R. 99 & 148) The court denied 
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. (R. 153) 
Thereafter, Defendant renewed its motion for summary 
judgment just prior to trial. (R. 182) Aqain the motion was 
denied and the matter proceeded to trial on March 11, 1987. 
Defendant continues to contend its motions for summary judgment 
were well-taken and the court erred in failing to order return of 
the stock to Defendant, as a matter of law. 
Trial occurred on March 11, 1987 before the Honorable Boyd 
L. Park, Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah. (R. 290) 
In a memorandum decision dated May 12, 1987, the court held 
the consulting agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant was 
wrongfully terminated "as it relates to (a) $600.00 for a 
gasoline benefit," and "(b) $2,699.55 for medical and insurance 
expenses the Plaintiff incurred during the term of the consulting 
agreement." (R. 299) The court further held Plaintiff was not 
entitled to any compensation under the consulting agreement since 
he did not work and there was no absolute provision providing a 
minimum of work days. (R. 299) In addition, the court ordered 
return of 11,445 shares of company stock inasmuch as the 
consulting agreement and the escrow agreement provided for the 
return of stock in the event the company was not sold or a public 
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or private sale of equity was not effected. (R. 299 & 314) The 
company was not sold nor was there a public or private sale of 
equity. (R. 299) Finally, the court distinguished 500 (five 
hundred) shares of stock issued to Plaintiff from the remaining 
11,445 shares of stock, ruling Plaintiff would be entitled to own 
the 500 shares. (R. 300) 
The order reflecting the court's decision was entered on the 
23rd day of June, 1987. (R. 313) Plaintiff filed its notice of 
appeal on July 23rd, 1987. (R. 317) Defendant filed its notice 
of cross appeal on August 6, 1987. (R. 568) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1 . I n J a n u a r y of 1 9 8 1 , R i c h a r d S m i t h , P l a i n t i f f , 
A p p e l l a n t , and Cros s Respondent ( h e r e i n a f t e r somet imes r e f e r r e d 
t o as "Smi th" ) was employed by Rocky Mountain H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . , 
D e f e n d a n t , R e s p o n d e n t , and Cross A p p e l l a n t ( h e r e i n a f t e r somet imes 
r e f e r r e d t o a s " R o c k y M o u n t a i n " ) t h r o u g h J a m e s B . B u r r , 
D e f e n d a n t ' s P r e s i d e n t , t o a c t in t h e c a p a c i t y of Vice P r e s i d e n t 
of F i n a n c e . ( T r . 13 & 159) 
2 . W i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t of a w r i t t e n employment c o n t r a c t 
(Tr . 1 3 ) , Smith and Rocky M o u n t a i n a g r e e d S m i t h would a c t a s 
Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s V i c e P r e s i d e n t of F i n a n c e under an o r i g i n a l 
c o m p e n s a t i o n p a c k a g e ag reemen t c a l l i n g fo r a s a l a r y , p l u s a 20% 
b o n u s on t h a t s a l a r y i f t h e c o m p a n y a c h i e v e d a c e r t a i n 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y l e v e l . (Tr . 16) 
3 . At t h e t ime of t h e o r i g i n a l d i s c u s s i o n s between Smith 
and Rocky Moun ta in , Mr. S m i t h ' s c h a r g e or j o b d e s c r i p t i o n was 
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outlined for him by Rocky Mountain's President, James B. Burr. 
(Tr. 13-16) 
4. The responsibilities of his job included, inter alia, 
an attempt to make peace with certain cteditors, including 
Teachers Insurance and Rocky Mountain's preferred shareholders, 
(Tr. 14 & 15) attempting to find new sources of financing, (Tr. 
16) and attempting to obtain a buyer for the company. (R. 291) 
5. Approximately twelve months into the relationship and 
after Mr. Smith had become actively involved in the job 
responsibilities previously outlined, Mr. Smith proposed to Rocky 
Mountain's President, James B. Burr, an arrangement suggesting 
Mr. Smith be permitted to have a stock ownership interest in the 
company whereby he might benefit from its growth. (Tr. 22 and 
Ex. 2, P. 8) 
6. Although he was never favorably inclined to do so (Tr. 
169), on two separate occasions, Mr. Burr approved issuance of 
stock to Mr. Smith. On the first sucti occasion, Mr. Burr 
approved issuance of certain shares previously owned by a former 
Rocky Mountain employee, Gary Fitzgerald. (Tr. 172) 
7. The stock previously owned by Gary Fitzgerald was 
issued to Mr. Smith without restrictions &nd no claim has been 
made for the return of those shares. (Tr. L73) 
8. This dispute is principally concerned with the rights, 
terms, and conditions governing 11,945 shares of stock issued to 
Smith on or about December 7, 1982. (Ex. 26) The 11,945 shares 
of stock were issued subject to certain restrictions, including a 
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right of recall , outlined in letters dated September 20th and 
December 8th, 1982. (Tr. 30 & 173 and Ex. 3 & 4) 
9. Mr. Burr's understanding of the right of recall 
outlined in the letter agreements governing the issuance of the 
disputed stock was very simple. So long as the stockholder was 
employed by the company he or she could retain the stock. If the 
stockholder was not employed, the stock was to be returned. (Tr. 
174) The letters of September 20th and December 8thf 1982, speak 
for themselves with respect to the understanding. (Ex. 3 & 4) 
10. At the time of issuing the disputed shares of stock Mr. 
Smith was fully aware of the terms and conditions governing the 
issuance, including the right to recall the stock, as outlined in 
the letters of September 20th and December 8th, 1982. (Tr. 33 & 
95 and R. 305) 
11. Mr. Smith further confirmed his understanding of Rocky 
Mountain's right to recall the disputed shares of stock by 
expressing, in his letter of September 20, 1982, a hope that his 
further performance would eliminate Rocky Mountain's right to 
recall the stock. (Tr. 33 and Ex. 3) 
12. Although Mr. Smith had expressed a hope his performance 
would eliminate Rocky Mountain's right to recall the stock, there 
were no discussions held regarding the level of performance 
necessary to eliminate the right of recall. (Tr. 96) 
13. Mr. Smith understood, however, the only manner in which 
he could force the elimination of the recall provisions was 
through sale of Rocky Mountain's stock under certain 
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circumstances. (Tr. 96) 
14. During 1983, Mr. Smith negotiated with Offshore 
Logistics for the sale of Rocky Mountain and in October of 1983, 
a letter of intent for the sale of Rocky Mountain to Offshore 
Logistics was prepared and executed. (R. 306 & Ex. 9) 
15. During this same period of time, the latter part of 
1983, as a result of differences regarding corporate policy, a 
rift arose between Mr. Burr and Mr. Smith. (R. 306) 
16. On or about November 15, 1983, the execution by Rocky 
Mountain of the letter of intent to Offshore Logistics, was 
approved by Rocky Mountain's board of directors. (R. 306 & Ex. 9 
& 23) 
17. Prior to finalization of the sales contract the offer 
from Offshore logistics to purchase Rocky Mountain was 
substantially reduced and the arrangement and all negotiations 
essentially fell apart. (Tr. 182 and R. 30^) 
18. At the same time the negotiations with Offshore 
Logistics were falling apart, the employment arrangement between 
Smith and Rocky Mountain was also collapsing. As a result of the 
major differences between Smith and Mr. Burr, Smith's position 
with the company was changed by Mr. Burr in a handwritten memo to 
Smith. (Ex. 11) In addition to outlining the change in 
position, the memo stated: "If the present sale proposal fails 
you will be asked to return your shares of stock December 31, 
1983." (Ex. 11) The sale proposal to which reference is made in 
the handwritten memo is that sale proposal to Offshore Logistics. 
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(R. 306) 
19. While Mr. Smith understood Mr. Burr expected return of 
the stock if the sale proposal failed (Tr. 105), Mr. Smith had no 
intention of doing so and told Mr. Burr that he was not going to 
return the stock. (Tr. 106) Mr. Smith believed that his efforts 
in connection with the Offshore Logistics negotiation permitted 
him to retain his stock due to Mr. Burr's refusal to complete the 
transaction with Offshore Logistics. (Tr. 106 & 108) 
20. On or about December 27, 1983, Mr. Smith proposed, as a 
counter-offer to the handwritten memorandum (Ex. 11) a consulting 
arrangement pursuant to which Rocky Mountain would retain his 
services as a consultant. (Tr. 53 & Ex. 12) 
21. While the consulting arrangement dated December 27f 
1983 was never executed, Rocky Mountain ultimately agreed to a 
modified consulting arrangement dated February 15, 1984. (Ex. 12 
& 13 and Tr. 55) 
22. At the time of executing the consulting arrangement, 
Mr. Smith resigned "as Chief Financial Officer, Vice President-
Finance and Treasurer of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. as well 
as any other positions of officership which I might hold with any 
subsidiary companies of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc." The 
resignation had effect from January 1, 1984. (Ex. 13) 
23. Thereafter, on or about March 2, 1984, Mr. Smith 
resigned as a Director of Rocky Mountain. (Ex. 27) 
24. Following Mr. Smith's resignation as Vice President 
Finance and Treasurer, but prior to his resignation as a 
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Director, he and Rocky Mountain entered into an escrow agreement 
(dated February 27, 1984) pursuant to which the disputed shares 
of stock were placed in escrow. (Ex. 14) 
25. Among other things, the escrow agreement contains 
language indicating it "replaces the letter agreements evidenced 
by letters dated September 20, 1982 and December 8, 1982 and is 
the sole agreement between [the parti |es] governing the 
disposition of the stock...." (Ex. 14, P. 2) It is the 
foregoing language that is the basis for Mir. Smith1 s position 
that the rights of recall outlined in the letters of September 
20th and December 8, 1982 were eliminated. (Tr. 118-119) The 
language was proposed by Mr. Smith. (Tr. 11)9) 
26. Regarding disposition of the stock, the escrow 
agreement essentially provides if Rocky Mountain was sold during 
the one year period of the escrow agreement, the stock would be 
returned to Mr. Smith. If the company wa& not sold during the 
one year period, the stock would revert to Rocky Mountain. (Ex. 
14 and R. 301) 
27. Mr. Smith and Mr. Burr did not discuss the parameters 
under which Rocky Mountain would agree to sell its stock or 
participate in a public or private sale of its stock. (R. 298) 
28. At no time during the one yeatf period of the escrow 
agreement did Rocky Mountain sell any of its stock or assets nor 
did it participate in a public or privatq sale of its stock or 
the stock of any subsidiary. (R. 308) In fact, at no time, 
since September 1982, has the company been sold or engaged in any 
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p r i v a t e or p u b l i c o f fe r ing of i t s s tock (Tr. 177) 
29. At t h e t ime of e x e c u t i n g the c o n s u l t i n g ag reemen t , 
t h e r e were no d i s c u s s i o n s b e t w e e n Mr. S m i t h and Mr. B u r r 
regard ing e l i m i n a t i o n of the r i g h t s of r e c a l l . (Tr. 121 & 186) 
30. I t i s Mr. B u r r ' s t e s t i m o n y Rocky Mountain never 
r e l i n q u i s h e d i t s r i g h t to r e c a l l the s tock and Mr. Smith never 
o f f e r e d a n y t h i n g in exchange for Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s a l l e g e d 
agreement to give up i t s r i g h t to r e c a l l the s t o c k . (Tr. 187) 
3 1 . On A p r i l 2 3 , 1984 Mr. Burr t e rmina ted the consu l t i ng 
ag reemen t due to Mr. Smi th ' s u n a v a i l a b i l i t y . (Ex. 20 and Tr. 
187) 
32. A l i t t l e l e s s than one year l a t e r , on the ann ive r sa ry 
of execut ing the c o n s u l t i n g arrangement , P l a i n t i f f f i l e d s u i t . 
(R. l ) 
33 . The case was submit ted to the Honorable Judge Boyd L. 
P a r k . The c o u r t he ld Mr. S m i t h ' s c o n s u l t i n g agreement was 
w r o n g f u l l y t e r m i n a t e d as i t r e l a t e s t o : (a) $600.00 for a 
ga so l i ne b e n e f i t , and (b) $2 ,699.55 for m e d i c a l and i n s u r a n c e 
expenses the P l a i n t i f f incur red dur ing the term of the consu l t i ng 
agreement . (R. 299) The cour t f u r t he r held Mr. Smith was not 
e n t i t l e d t o any compensation for work days under the consu l t i ng 
a g r e e m e n t , " inasmuch as he d id not work, nor was t h e r e an 
abso lu t e p r o v i s i o n prov id ing a minimum of work d a y s . " (R. 299) 
34. With r e spec t t o the d i spu ted sha res of s t o c k , the Court 
held 11,445 sha res of s tock should be re tu rned to Rocky Mountain 
s i n c e Rocky Mountain "was not so ld nor was t h e r e a p u b l i c or 
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private sale of equity. To believe the Plaintiff could have sold 
the company or effected a public or private Sale of equity within 
one year, when there was no agreement as toi the terms of either 
would be speculative." (R. 299) 
35. Finally, the court held 500 shares of the company 
stock issued to Mr. Smith should be d is|t i ngu ished from the 
remaining shares issued in connection with Certificate No. 103 
ordering Plaintiff was entitled to the 500 shares. (R. 300) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rocky Mountain's brief is intended to establish, among other 
things, the following. First, the cdurt, in ruling the 
consulting arrangement was wrongfully terminated, failed to enter 
a finding establishing the consulting arrangement was subject to 
wrongful termination, i.e. the court did not find, and Defendant 
contends the evidence does not support a finding that, the 
consulting arrangement was something "mor^ than an indefinite 
general hiring . . .terminable at the will of either party." 
Defendant's position is the consulting arrangement amounted to an 
indefinite general hiring and was not subject to wrongful 
termination, as a matter of law. 
Second, the evidence is insufficient to support, and the 
court erred in making, a finding that the consulting arrangement 
was wrongfully terminated in any respect. Mr. Smith's 
unavailability, as reflected by the fact h^ did not work a single 
day under the consulting arrangement, constituted "just cause" 
for terminating the arrangement. Moreover, the termination 
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amounted to nothing more than cutting off the ongoing flow of 
benefits to Mr. Smith, without consideration in return. 
Third, the court erred in awarding a gasoline benefit, in 
the amount of $600.00, to Mr. Smith, since Smiths' testimony 
estimated his loss at no more than $450.00. In addition, Smith's 
evidence on dental expenses is much too speculative to support an 
award. Finally, with respect to damages, Smith's evidence on 
medical expenses violates the best evidence rule and should not 
support an award. 
Fourth, all 11,945 shares of stock (the disputed stock) 
issued to Smith were governed by the same terms and conditions. 
The court erred in distinguishing 500 shares from the remaining 
11,445 shares and ordering return of the 500 shares to Smith. 
Fifth, contrary to Plaintiff's contention at trial and in 
his brief on appeal, the evidence simply does not support a 
finding that Defendant prevented Plaintiff's performance under 
the consulting arrangement. The court's finding that Plaintiff 
was not completely frustrated and prevented from finding a buyer 
has ample support in the record. 
Sixth, regardless of whether Defendant prevented Plaintiff's 
performance under the consulting agreement, it is entirely 
inappropriate, under the facts of this case, to assume Plaintiff 
could have performed. Again, the court's finding that Smith and 
Burr had not agreed upon any specific parameters for the sale of 
Rocky Mountain or additional infusion of capital and that it 
would be highly speculative to determine Plaintiff could have 
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performed, has ample support in the record. 
Finally, Rocky Mountain is entitled to Return of the stock, 
as a matter of law, under at least three different theories. 
First, there was no consideration from Smith at the time of 
issuing the stock. Second, Mr. Smith's claim that Rocky Mountain 
relinquished its right to recall the stock at the time of 
executing the escrow agreement, clearly describes a modification 
of the original arrangement. The alleged modification was not 
supported by consideration and must fail as a result. 
Consequently, Rocky Mountain retained the right to recall the 
stock as outlined in the letter agreements. (Ex. 3 & 4) 
Finally, under the terms and conditions outlined in the 
consulting arrangement and escrow agreement, Rocky Mountain is 
presently entitled to return of the disputed! stock. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONSULTING ARRANGEMENT WAS NOTHING MORE THAN A 
PERSONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT TERMINABLE AT THE WILL 
OF EITHER PARTY. 
The trial court's finding of wrongful termination of the 
consulting arrangement, as it relates to certain items, is 
necessarily based upon a premise, not reflected in the court's 
findings, that the consulting arrangement w^s something more than 
a personal employment contract terminable at the will of either 
party. A contract terminable at the will of either party, cannot 
be wrongfully terminated. It may be terminated for "no cause, 
good cause, or even cause morally wrong without fear of 
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l i a b i l i t y . " Rose v . A l l i e d D e v e l o p m e n t C o . , 719 P.2d 8 3 , 84 
(Utah 1986) 
Defendant questions the premise that the employment contract 
was other than terminable at will. Regarding personal employment 
contracts terminable at the will of either party, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The general rule concerning personal employment 
contracts is, in the absence of some further express 
or implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or of a good consideration in addition to 
the services contracted to be rendered, the contract 
is no more than an indefinite general hiring which 
is terminable at the will of either party. 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979) 
It is apparent the parties intended the original employment 
arrangement to be an arrangement terminable at the will of either 
party. Several factors reflect that intent. 
First, no written employment contract was executed. (Tr. 
13) Second, on at least one occasion Mr. Smith and Mr. Burr 
discussed Mr. Burr's belief that Smith considered Rocky Mountain 
"only as a place to sit while waiting for a better opportunity to 
come." (Ex. 2, P. 8) Third, Smith, by memo, suggested to Mr. 
Burr there was "nothing to tie me to the company" and proposed he 
ought to own 10% of the outstanding stock not only to compensate 
him for his perceived "major accomplishments and contributions to 
the company," but also because the ownership interest would have 
the effect of "tying me much more closely to Rocky...." (Ex. 2, 
P. 8 & 9) Finally, the letter agreements of September 20th and 
December 8th, 1982, governing issuance of the disputed stock, 
clearly contemplate Smith's freedom to resign at any time, though 
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he would be required to return the disputed stock. (Ex. 3 & 4) 
There simply can be no question, with respect to the 
original hiring of Smith, "the final Employment contract 
contained no express terms concerning the duration of the 
Plaintiff's employment. Rather, the evidence indicates that both 
parties intended the employment to be indefinite and terminable 
at the will of either party." (Bihlmaier at 792) 
Presumably then "plaintiff contends that this informal at-
will employment contract metamorphosed ihto a contract for a 
definite term, a contract which could onl^ be terminated for 
cause." (Rose at 85) 
The exceptions necessary to successfully remove an 
employment contract out of the at-will (category, initially 
outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Bihl iqaier, were reiterated 
in Rose. The court stated: 
[In] the absence of some further express 
or implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or of a good consideration in addition 
to the services contracted to be rendered, the 
contract is no more than an indefinite general 
hiring which is terminable at the will of either 
party. Rose at 85. 
If Plaintiff contends the consulting Arrangement amounts to 
"some further express or implied stipulatibn as to the duration 
of the employment or...a good consideration in addition to the 
services contracted to be rendered..." Defendant disputes the 
contention. Defendant believes the consulting arrangement "is no 
more than an indefinite general hiring whic}h is terminable at the 
will of either party." 
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Mr, Smith's memo, outlining the consulting arrangement (Ex. 
13) is intended to outline "the basis on which I would continue 
to be of service to Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. over the 
next year." Although it makes reference to "the next year," the 
memo falls far short of committing either party to a one-year 
obligation. In fact, Rocky Mountain had no ability to require 
Smith to work under the consulting agreement since he merely 
agreed to "target eight days a month of work based on my 
availability concurrent with the work requirements of RMH." (Ex. 
13, P. 2, Par. 3) 
If Smith chose not to work, claiming he was unavailable, 
Rocky Mountain had no legal basis to compel him to do so. In 
other words, Smith was able to eliminate or terminate his 
obligations under the agreement by simply being unavailable. It 
is precisely that unavailability, along with the ongoing 
provision of benefits to Smith without consideration in return, 
that precipitated Mr. Burr's termination of the consulting 
arrangement. Furthermore, if Rocky Mountain had no "work 
requirements" for Smith there is nothing in the consulting 
arrangement compelling Rocky Mountain to use his services. 
Defendant likewise believes Plaintiff is hard pressed to 
show "a good consideration in addition to the services contracted 
to be rendered" as part of the consulting arrangement. The 
issues of consideration will be discussed in more detail later in 
this brief. Suffice it so say Plaintiff, in proposing the 
consulting arrangement, agreed to do nothing more than he had 
18 
previously agreed to do. The consulting arrangement simply 
provided Plaintiff with a one-year opportunity to sell Rocky 
Mountain after Plaintiff had resigned his position. Certainly 
Rocky Mountain never had an obligation to provide the additional 
one-year opportunity and should not now be penalized for its 
generosity in doing so. 
As a final brief argument, it seems incongruous to contend a 
consultant has a right to work and be paid irrespective of a need 
for consulting services. If a businessman nas no need for the 
professional advise and opinion of a consultant, what law compels 
that businessman to provide work to the consultant. The very 
nature of a consulting agreement is to provide professional 
services as needed and must be terminable ^t the will of either 
party. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO A VALID EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
EXISTED IT WAS TERMINATED WITH JUST CAtfSE. 
Assuming the consulting arrangement w^s not terminable at-
will, it is Defendant's position the arrahqement was terminated 
with "just cause." Regarding termination for good cause the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico has stated: 
Termination for good cause shown is a jrestriction 
on the employers right to discharge an; employee 
at will. Such a provision is an employment 
condition guaranteeing...against the whim or caprice 
of an employer allowing discharge only for legal 
cause, i.e., some causes inherent in and related 
to the qualifications of the employee or a failure 
to properly perform some essential aspect of the 
employee's job function. Panzer v. Pifofessional 
Insuror's, Inc., 101 N.M. 178, 679 P.2d 1276, 1280 
(N.M. 1984). 
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Although the trial court made no finding as to whether good 
cause did or did not exist to terminate the consulting 
arrangement, again it must be presumed the court's ruling 
regarding wrongful termination of certain aspects of the 
arrangement is premised upon a conclusion there was no just cause 
for the termination. Termination for just cause does not amount 
to wrongful termination. Once againf Defendant questions the 
premise. 
Within eighteen weeks of his employment, Smith and Mr. Burr 
had "strong basic disagreements over the course [Mr. Smith] was 
taking." (Ex. 2, P. 1) Within six months of Smith's employment, 
Mr. Burr expressed to Mr. Smith his disappointment in Smith's 
performance as an employee and officer of the company. (Tr. 179) 
Burr further indicated if Smith's performance did not improve, he 
would have to terminate him. (Tr. 179) Mr. Smith acknowledges 
Mr. Burr had questioned his commitment to Rocky Mountain. (Ex. 
2, P. 8) 
An additional factor creating friction between Mr. Smith and 
Mr. Burr was the issue of ownership. Mr. Burr testified "that 
from almost the first day we met on our first interview, the 
issue of ownership with Richard was very important. He discussed 
it very frequently purposed [sic] it often throughout the term of 
his employment at the company." (Tr. 168) Issuing stock to Mr. 
Smith was something Mr. Burr was "never favorably inclined to 
do " (Tr. 169) 
Contrary to what Plaintiff would have the court believe, 
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f a c t s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o h i s t e r m i n a t i o n e x i s t e d long b e f o r e t h e 
c o n s u l t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t a n d , in f a c t , c o n s i d e r a b l y b e f o r e any 
s t o c k was i s s u e d t o h im. 
While Smith d i s p u t e s t h e t e s t i m o n y , Mr. Burr i s c l e a r t h a t 
t h e c o n s u l t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t was t e r m i n a t e d d u e t o S m i t h ' s 
u n a v a i l a b i l i t y . (Tr . 187-189 & Ex. 20) M|r. Burr a t t e m p t e d t o 
c o n t a c t Smith over a two month p e r i o d of t i m £ , on "more t h a n f i v e 
and l e s s t han t e n " o c c a s i o n s . (T r . 189) D e s p i t e t h e s e a t t e m p t s 
Smith d id not work a s i n g l e day under t h e c o n s u l t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t . 
( T r . 62 & R. 310) W h i l e S m i t h p r o v i d e d no s e r v i c e s t o Rocky 
M o u n t a i n u n d e r t h e c o n s u l t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t , R o c k y M o u n t a i n 
c o n t i n u e d t o p r o v i d e S m i t h t h e b e n e f i t s o u t l i n e d in t h e 
a r r a n g e m e n t . (Ex. 1 3 , p a r . 4 - 5 ) F i n a l l y , t h e a g r e e m e n t was 
t e r m i n a t e d . (Ex. 20) 
I t s eems a p p a r e n t S m i t h ' s u n a v a i l a b i l i t y a m o u n t s t o "a 
f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y p e r f o r m some e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t of t h e 
e m p l o y e e ' s job f u n c t i o n . " As a r e s u l t , t e r m i n a t i o n o c c u r r e d w i th 
j u s t c a u s e . The e v i d e n c e i s s imply not s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a 
f i n d i n g of wrongfu l t e r m i n a t i o n in any r e s p e c t . 
POINT I I I 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE COURT ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The t r i a l c o u r t a w a r d e d P l a i n t i f f S600.00 fo r a g a s o l i n e 
b e n e f i t and $ 2 , 6 9 9 . 5 5 fo r med i ca l and i n s u r a n c e e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d 
d u r i n g t h e c o n s u l t i n g a g r e e m e n t . E v i d e n c e on damages was 
p r o f f e r e d by P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l w i t | h o u t o b j e c t i o n f r o m 
D e f e n d a n t . 
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R e g a r d i n g t h e g a s o l i n e b e n e f i t , P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l 
p ro f fe red an amount of $600.00. (Tr. 76) After c o n s u l t i n g with 
h i s c l i e n t , P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel reduced the p ro f fe r to $500.00. 
(Tr. 77) T h e r e a f t e r , P l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d he es t imated h i s l o s s e s 
on the g a s o l i n e b e n e f i t t o be "maybe $400.00, $450.00 ." (Tr. 77) 
Despi te the foregoing co l loquy , the cour t awarded $600.00 to 
P l a i n t i f f . Defendant contends the cour t e r r ed in e s t a b l i s h i n g 
t h e award and b e l i e v e s t h e award shou ld no t h a v e e x c e e d e d 
$450.00, P l a i n t i f f ' s h ighes t e s t i m a t e . 
The award for medical and insurance expenses c o n s i s t s , as 
near as Defendant can d e t e r m i n e , of a mathematical e r r o r and 
$708.15 for the cos t of medical insurance purchased by P l a i n t i f f 
(Tr. 77 ) , $1,111.40 in a c t u a l medical expenses incur red (Tr. 77 ) , 
and $850.00 for Smi th ' s den ta l work " t h a t would have been done 
but t h e y . . . s i m p l y did not have the funds . " (Tr. 78) The t h r e e 
items t o t a l $2 ,669 .55 , yet the cour t awarded $2 ,699 .55 . 
Regarding the award for den ta l work, Defendant ' s ob jec t ion 
i s simply t h a t the award i s much too s p e c u l a t i v e . P l a i n t i f f ' s 
counsel was c e r t a i n l y aware of t h a t fac t in p re fac ing h i s p rof fe r 
with the remark "I d o n ' t know whether i t would be compensable or 
n o t . . . . " (Tr. 78) Had he known i t would be compensated, I am 
c e r t a i n he and h i s c l i e n t could have thought of many o ther t h ings 
" t h a t would have been done but they . . . simply did not have the 
funds . " The award should be r e v e r s e d . 
F i n a l l y , w h i l e c o u n s e l for Defendant d id not o b j e c t to 
P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel p r o f f e r i n g ev idence , he c e r t a i n l y objected to 
22 
t h e p r o f f e r r e g a r d i n g sums expended for irtedical insurance and 
a c t u a l medical expenses . The ob jec t ions were made both a t the 
t ime of the p ro f fe r (Tr. 77) and during cl|osing arguments (Tr. 
234) . 
P l a i n t i f f ' s p r o f f e r r e g a r d i n g sums Expended for medical 
insurance and a c t u a l medical expenses was n o t h i n g more than a 
v e r b a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o t h e c o u r t o u t l i n i n g t h e amounts 
P l a i n t i f f claimed to have s p e n t . This cour t w i l l note the record 
i s c o m p l e t e l y v o i d of p h y s i c i a n ' s or o t h e r i n v o i c e s or 
P l a i n t i f f ' s cance l led checks . P l a i n t i f f ' s ) p r o f f e r amounts to 
nothing more than p leading damages. In t h£ t regard the Supreme 
Court of Wyoming has s t a t e d : 
Appel lant has e n t i r e l y overlooked the rtecessity 
of proving damages. He apparen t ly equates p leading 
damages with the proof of damages. We know of no 
cases nor s t a t u t e s t h a t permit damages based s o l e l y 
on an a l l e g a t i o n of damages. Damages cannot be 
presumed. One who claims damages has the burden 
of proving them. Consequently, absent proof, a 
claim for damages f a i l s . S t a t e ex r e l . Scholl v . 
Anselmi, 640 P.2d 746, 749 (Wyoming 1982) 
F u r t h e r m o r e , P l a i n t i f f ' s p r o f f e r on med ica l expenses 
v i o l a t e s the b e s t - e v i d e n c e r u l e . The Utah Supreme Court has 
i nd i ca t ed a P l a i n t i f f ' s burden of proof to e s t a b l i s h a bas i s for 
an award of damages i s met "where the P l a i n t i f f has provided the 
b e s t e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o him unde r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " 
Penelko, I nc . v. John P r i c e A s s o c i a t e s , In<j?., 642 P.2d 1229, 1233 
(Utah 1982). C e r t a i n l y P l a i n t i f f has f a i l e d t o meet t h a t burden. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s lack of documentary ev idence , placed Defendant 
a t an extreme d isadvantage during c ros s - examina t ion . P l a i n t i f f 
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s o u g h t and r e c o v e r e d e x p e n s e s bo th for p u r c h a s e of h e a l t h 
insurance and payment of medical e x p e n s e s . While P l a i n t i f f ' s 
counsel i nd ica t ed the medical insurance was purchased a f t e r the 
payment of medical expenses , Defendant was not in a p o s i t i o n to 
d i s p u t e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n due t o t h e c o m p l e t e l a c k of 
documentary ev idence . Recovery for medical expenses incurred and 
for purchase of hea l t h insurance seems d u p l i c a t i v e . 
Defendant contends P l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o meet i t s burden of 
proof on medical damages, t h a t t h e r e i s no competent evidence t o 
suppor t such an award, and the c o u r t ' s order should be r e v e r s e d . 
In summary , r e g a r d i n g P l a i n t i f f ' s damages , Defendant 
con tends , assuming arguendo the wrongful t e r m i n a t i o n o c c u r r e d , 
P l a i n t i f f ' s damages amount on ly to $450.00 for a g a s o l i n e 
b e n e f i t . The remaining damages a re e i t h e r too s p e c u l a t i v e or not 
supported by competent ev idence . 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 500 OF THE SHARES ISSUED 
TO PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE 
REMAINING 11,445 SHARES WHEN ALL SHARES WERE ISSUED 
UNDER THE SAME CERTIFICATE SUBJECT TO THE SAME TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS. 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court ruled "Plaintiff 
is entitled to own the 500 shares of company stock issued to him 
as a bonus. Since the company elected to issue such shares as a 
stock bonus, such shares so issued should not be a part of the 
stock issued under the call provisions of the letter agreements 
or the provisions of the consulting agreement and the escrow 
agreement." (R. 300) 
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The evidence revealed that at the saflie time the disputed 
shares of stock were issued to Plaintiff, stock in the company 
was issued to other key employees based upon completed years of 
service. (Ex. 23) Of the 11,945 shares issued to Plaintiff, 500 
were issued based upon his one year of service to Rocky Mountain. 
(Ex. 23 & R. 292-293) 
In distinguishing the 500 shares of stock issued to Smith, 
under a years of service incentive, the trial court appears to 
overlook the fact the stock issued to other employees was issued 
under similar restrictions. (Tr. 174) Regarding the stock 
issued to Smith and to the various employees, Mr. Burr explained: 
"The understanding is very simple and that ils that as long as the 
stockholder involved in these and other shares of stock similar 
to them we have discussed today were employed by the company 
actively engaged as an employee they could retain the stock. If 
they were not the stock was to be returned pure and simple." 
(Tr. 174) 
As Defendant attempted to introduce evidence establishing 
that other employees received stock under conditions similar to 
those under which the disputed shares wdre issued, the court, 
following the objection of counsel for Plaintiff, refused to 
permit the introduction of such evidence. (Tr. 174) Thereafter, 
having refused to admit evidence regarding the similarities in 
the stock issued to other employees, the court determined, and 
ruled, the stock issued to Smith under the years of service 
incentive was distinguishable from the remaining stock issued to 
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Smith and ordered Smith should be permitted to re ta in the 500 
shares . 
The fact of the matter is all 11,945 shares of stock issued 
to Mr. Smith were issued under one stock certificate (Ex. 26) and 
all 11,945 shares of stock were governed by the same terms and 
conditions. (Ex. 3 & 4) The court's distinction is simply not 
supported by the evidence. 
POINT V 
WITH OR WITHOUT A FINDING OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION, 
THE EVIDENCE IS COMPLETELY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT OR ANY OF ITS AGENTS OR 
OFFICERS PREVENTED PLAINTIFF FROM PERFORMING UNDER 
THE CONSULTING ARRANGEMENT. 
In his brief, Plaintiff claims Defendant prevented him from 
performance under the consulting arrangement. Relying upon 
Williston On Contracts and various decisions from surrounding 
states, Plaintiff contends his performance under the consulting 
arrangement should be assumed if Rocky Mountain engaged in 
conduct precluding Plaintiff from the possibility of performance. 
Presumably, Plaintiff asks this court to assume he could have 
sold Rocky Mountain, but was prevented from doing so. 
Plaintiff acknowledges the lower court found "despite 
termination of the contract, Smith was not completely frustrated 
and prevented from finding a buyer for the company within the one 
year time period stated in the contract." (R. 299) Plaintiff 
claims such a finding is in direct conflict with a finding of 
wrongful termination of the contract. Irrespective of whether 
the two findings are in conflict, the court's conclusion that 
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Smith was not prevented from finding a buyet for the company is 
adequately supported by the evidence. 
Smith claims following the terminatibn of the consulting 
arrangement he was prevented from selling Rc^cky Mountain because 
he was no longer "retained by Jim Burr or orfr behalf of him to do 
anything." (Tr. 127) He acknowledges, however, termination did 
not prevent him from going to Jim Burr with an offer of a buyer 
nor did it prevent him from asking for financial records to 
present to a buyer. (Tr. 127) 
Smith further claims that, following termination of the 
consulting arrangement, he was prevented from making further 
efforts to sell the company because he was not going to be paid 
for those efforts. (Tr. 128) Apparently, he ignores the fact 
that if he were successful in selling the company, his interest, 
including the disputed and non-disputed shares of stock, would 
have been slightly less than one quarter of one million dollars. 
(Tr. 212) With such an incentive he should not be heard to claim 
he was prevented from performance because Jie was not to be paid. 
Certainly Mr. Burr never believed th^t in terminating the 
consulting arrangement he was terminating Smith's ability to sell 
Rocky Mountain. He testifies, "matter of fact I specifically 
remember discussing that with him and he said that well maybe I 
can find somebody else to buy it and I saipl, please feel free to 
do that." (Tr. 190) 
The one witness who was able to testify without bias, Lewis 
Tippetts (who replaced Mr. Smith at Rocky Mountain (Tr. 146)), 
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indicated: "I guess my feelings were of cooperation. I liked 
Richard and I wanted to work with him as best I could to get the 
company sold if there was a buyer out there." (Tr. 152) Mr. 
Tippetts further testified that Mr. Burr's attitude was 
"generally cooperative." (Tr. 152) 
Mr. Smith was simply unable to produce a buyer ready, 
willing, and able to purchase Rocky Mountain. Had he done so, 
there is absolutely no evidence indicating he would not have 
received complete cooperation. 
Finally, Mr. Smith claims he was prevented from meeting with 
"investors from New York, who were working on the equity sale of 
the company." (Brief P. 10) The evidence makes clear the 
individuals from New York were consultants and not investors. 
(Tr. 219) Mr. Smith's argument essentially takes the position 
Rocky Mountain had an obligation to provide him with a buyer with 
whom he could negotiate the sale of Rocky Mountain. Certainly 
there is no agreement or understanding between Smith and Rocky 
Mountain that would require Rocky Mountain to provide Smith with 
investors to negotiate a sale. Likewise, there is nothing that 
would prevent Rocky Mountain from retaining additional 
consultants for the purpose of attempting to negotiate a sale or 
for any other purpose. Mr. Smith was perfectly able to bring to 
Rocky Mountain, at any time, a buyer for the company. Nothing 
Rocky Mountain did, prevented Smith from doing so. 
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POINT VI 
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE IT IS ENTIRELY 
INAPPROPRIATE TO ASSUME MR. SMITH COULD HAVE 
PERFORMED THE CONDITIONS UNDER THE CONSULTING 
ARRANGEMENT NECESSARY TO PERMIT HIM TO CJBTAIN, 
WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS, THE DISPUTED STOCK. 
The only condition Plaintiff was required to satisfy in 
order to obtain the disputed stock was to see that Rocky Mountain 
was sold or engaged in a successful public ot private offering of 
its common stock. (Ex. 3, 4, & 14) As previously noted, the 
condition simply was never satisfied. 
It is interesting to note the Williston language upon which 
Plaintiff relies in support of his position that his performance 
should be assumed (Brief P. 10) is prefaced by the statement: 
" [ I ] t is not enough that the promisor evidently would have 
prevented performance of the condition. Ilf the promisee could 
not or would not have performed the condition or it would not 
have happened whatever had been the promisor's conduct, the 
condition is not excused." (Williston on Cojntracts Third Edition 
Sec. 677 at 232) 
It is a rather substantial assumption to believe Plaintiff 
could have or would have performed the condition, i.e. Plaintiff 
could have or would have been able to s|ee to it that Rocky 
Mountain was sold or participated in a successful public or 
private offering of its stock. Willi ston outlines the scenario 
as follows: 
The illustrations of this principle ar0 legion. 
Any number of cases involving in this principle may 
be found in connection with contracts /^here brokers 
are seeking to recover their commissions claiming 
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that the owner of land has prevented the sale by a 
refusal to pursue the contract with a bona fide 
purchaser... 
The contention...is that...when an agent procures 
a purchaser on the terms proposed by the principal, 
and the latter accepts the purchaser, then he is 
entitled to his commissions whether the defaulting 
purchaser is or is not responsible. 
The contention, on the other hand, is that before 
the agent is entitled to compensation, the purchaser 
must not only have entered into an agreement to 
purchase but must also have actually complied with 
its terms, unless compliance is prevented by the 
fault of the principal. (Williston Sec. 677 at 
225-230) 
Plaintiff's position is obviously flawed in at least two 
respects. First, Plaintiff and Mr. Burr never agreed upon "the 
terms proposed by the principal" for the sale of Rocky Mountain 
or for additional infusion of capital into the company. (R. 298) 
Second, while a letter of intent was executed between Offshore 
Logistics and Rocky Mountain (Ex. 9), Offshore Logistics never 
"actually complied with its terms." The original proposal, 
outlined in the letter of intent was for $1,000,000.00 cash upon 
closing, and $2,000,000.00 in the form of a promissory note 
and/or Offshore Logistics preferred stock. (Ex. 9) The offer 
was ultimately reduced to "approximately $1,000,000.00 in notes" 
(Tr. 182), and the discussions between Offshore Logistics and 
Rocky Mountain fell apart. (Ex. 25) 
Knowing Smith and Rocky Mountain never agreed to the terms 
and conditions acceptable for the purchase of Rocky Mountain by 
Offshore Logistics, Inc., Offshore Logistics, Inc., never 
actually complied with the terms of the letter of intent and 
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there were no other discussions pending with a prospective 
purchaser, it is entirely inappropriate to assume Smith could 
have satisfied the conditions necessary to obtain an unrestricted 
right to the disputed stock. The trial coUrt specifically so 
found, concluding it would be "speculative on the part of the 
court to determine that Plaintiff could have performed, given the 
chance he believe [sic] he was prevented by Burr from having." 
(R. 298) 
POINT VII 
CONSIDERING ALL MATERIAL FACTS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN IS 
ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE DISPUTED STOCJK AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
D u r i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s be low, on two o c c a s i o n s , Defendant 
a t t e m p t e d t o r e s o l v e t h e i s s u e s r e l a t e d t o t h e d i s p u t e d s t o c k 
t h r o u g h m o t i o n s f o r p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t . (R. 99 & 182) 
Defendant c o n t i n u e s t o b e l i e v e t h e i s s u e s r e l a t e d t o t h e d i s p u t e d 
s t o c k can be r e s o l v e d a s a m a t t e r of law. 
In a d d i t i o n t o t h e two p r i n c i p a l a rguments p r e s e n t e d a t t h e 
t ime of a r g u i n g D e f e n d a n t ' s mo t ions fo r p a r t i a l summary judgment , 
Mr. S m i t h ' s t e s t i m o n y , a t t h e t i m e of t r ^ a l r g i v e s r i s e t o a 
t h i r d argument t h a t t h e s t o c k shou ld be r e t u r n e d a s a m a t t e r of 
law. The a rgumen t s a r e based upon t h e c l a r i t y of t h e w r i t t e n 
d o c u m e n t s g o v e r n i n g i s s u a n c e of t h e s t o c k and i s s u e s of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
POINT VII(A) 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RETURN OF TH$ STOCK SINCE 
IT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION FROM PLAINTIFF. 
"If one party asks for and receives something which he would 
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not otherwise be entitled to from the other, that is adequate 
consideration." Gorgoza v. Utah State Road Commission, 553 P.2d 
413, 416 (Utah 1976) In other words, "when a party merely does 
what he has already obligated himself to do, he cannot demand an 
additional compensation therefor, and, although by taking 
advantage of the necessities of his adversary, he obtains a 
promise for more, the law will regard it as nudum pactum, and 
will not lend its process to aid in the wrong." Williston on 
Contracts Third Edition, Sec. 130 at 532 
At trial, Mr. Smith outlined his job description and 
responsibilities. (Tr. 13-16) In addition, Smith stated: "The 
original compensation package agreement...was a salary plus a 20% 
bonus on that salary if the company achieved a certain 
profitability level." (Tr. 16) Smith acknowledges the original 
arrangement included no provision for stock compensation. (Tr. 
81) 
The board of directors resolution approving the issuance of 
the disputed shares of stock to Mr. Smith identifies the 
consideration for that issuance as "Smith's performance in 
securing releases by the preferred shareholders of their stock 
conversion rights via letters of credit...." (Ex. 23) 
It is Defendant's contention the consideration identified in 
the resolution of the board of directors and the testimony 
offered by Mr. Smith at the time of trial regarding what he had 
done to "earn the stock" fail to identify any performance on the 
part of Mr. Smith that was not included in his original job 
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description. Plaintiff understood his job responsibilities from 
the beginning and agreed to perform them in exchange for a salary 
plus a bonus contingent upon Rocky Mountain'ls profitability. As 
a result, he is unable to show that in cbnsi derat ion of its 
agreement to issue stock to Smith, Rocky Mountain asked for or 
received "something which [it] would not otherwise be entitled to 
from [Smith]...." Since Smith's performance amounts to nothing 
more than "what he...already obligated hims0lf to do, he cannot 
demand additional compensation therefore..." As a result, 
Defendant is entitled to the disputed stock due to the complete 
lack of consideration from Plaintiff at the time of issuance. 
POINT VII (B) 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE STOCK PURSUANT 
TO THE RIGHTS OF RECALL OUTLINED IN THEJ LETTERS OF 
SEPTEMBER 20TH AND DECEMBER 8TH, 1982. 
In the proceedings below, Plaintiff m&de abundantly clear 
his position that the rights of recall outlined in the letters of 
September 20th and December 8th, 1982 were Eliminated at the time 
of entering into the escrow agreement. C|Tr. 119) Since Smith 
also acknowledges he was well aware of the terms and conditions 
governing the issuance of the stock, as outlined in the letter of 
September 20th, 1982, and Rocky Mountain's right to recall the 
stock (Tr. 9 5 ) , it is apparent his position regarding the 
elimination of the rights of recall amounts to a modification of 
the original agreement. 
The law is clear that "a subsequent agreement modifying an 
existing contract must be supported by new consideration 
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independent of the consideration involved in the original 
agreement." Boardman v. Dorsett, 685 P.2d 615, 617 (Wash. App. 
1984) cf. Williston on Contracts Third Edition, Sec. 1826 at 487. 
Utah courts have identified the requirement as a need for 
mutual assent. 
"It is true that parties to a written contract may 
modify, waive, or make new contractual terms, even 
if the contract itself contains a provision to the 
contrary. (Citations omitted) However, the minds 
of the parties must have met upon an asserted 
contract modification....(Citations omitted)" 
Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Company, Inc., 
603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) 
In response to a question as to what he had done to "earn 
the stock", or eliminate the rights of recall, Smith spent, 
without much success, a considerable amount of time attempting to 
identify just what he had done in return for Rocky Mountain's 
agreement to eliminate the right of recall. (Tr. 109-113) 
Smith's difficulty in explaining the consideration given is 
rather simply explained by the fact Rocky Mountain received 
nothing which it was not otherwise previously entitled to. In 
addition, after attempting to explain what he had done to earn 
the stock, Mr. Smith ultimately acknowledged the stock was to be 
"earned" by the sale of Rocky Mountain. (Tr. 114) 
With respect to mutual assent, the conflicting testimony 
between Mr. Smith and Mr. Burr makes evident the fact that mutual 
assent was never reached. While Mr. Smith claims the language in 
the escrow agreement eliminated the rights of recall (Tr. 118), 
Mr. Burr testified there were never any discussions regarding 
elimination of the rights of recall, Rocky Mountain was never 
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offered anything to give up the rights of recall, and Mr. Burr 
never believed Rocky Mountain had relinquished its rights of 
recall. (Tr. 187) The trial court failed to resolve the 
conflicting testimony, finding simply that bhe testimony was in 
dispute. (R. 297, Par. 22 & 23) 
The complete lack of consideration and mutual assent makes 
evident the fact Rocky Mountain never agreed to eliminate the 
rights of recall governing the original issuance of stock. As a 
result, upon termination of Smith's employment, Rocky Mountain 
was entitled, as a matter of law, to return of the stock. 
POINT VII (C) 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE CONSULTING AND ESCROW 
AGREEMENTS GOVERNED THE DISPOSITION OF THE 
DISPUTED STOCK, ROCKY MOUNTAIN IS ENTITLED TO 
RETURN THEREOF AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Ignoring virtually every argument previously made in this 
brief, Defendant is entitled to return <if the stock under the 
terms and conditions of the consulting arrangement and the escrow 
agreement. Under cross-examination Mr. Smith acknowledged that 
under the consulting arrangement, if Rocky Mountain "was not sold 
to a third party or parties or there was no private or public 
placement of stock that I was able to affect [sic] during that 
one year period then the stock would revert." (Tr. 125) 
Based upon Smith's acknowledged understanding, the argument 
is very simple. Rocky Mountain has not been sold since September 
of 1982, nor has it engaged in a private or public offering of 
stock. (Tr. 177) While Mr. Smith claims he was prevented from 
selling Rocky Mountain, the evidence, as discussed in Points V 
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and VI herein, simply does not support such a contention. As a 
result, Rocky Mountain is entitled to return of the stock. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's finding of wrongful termination of the 
consulting arrangement rests on an inadequate foundation. The 
original understanding negotiated between Smith and Mr. Burr 
falls within the category of " an indefinite general 
hi ring... terminable at the will of either party." The subsequent 
consulting arrangement falls into the same category. It 
stretches the imagination to believe one could be compelled to 
receive and pay for consulting services. Nothing in the 
consulting arrangement compels Smith to work or Rocky Mountain to 
accept his service. As such, the consulting arrangement is also 
terminable at will and not subject to wrongful termination as a 
matter of law. If the "employment contract" is not subject to 
wrongful termination, the damages awarded due to its wrongful 
termination must fail. 
Assuming the consulting arrangement was something more than 
"an indefinite general hiring...terminable at the will of either 
party" the record contains ample evidence to support a finding of 
termination with "just cause." Termination with "just cause" 
cannot, as a matter of law, amount to wrongful termination. 
Again, without wrongful termination, the damages awarded to 
Plaintiff must fail. 
The evidence proffered by Plaintiff fails to support the 
court's award. Assuming a valid employment contract existed and 
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was wrongfully terminated, the evidence supports, at best, an 
award of $450.00 for a gasoline benefit. 
All 11,945 shares (the disputed shares) issued to Plaintiff 
are governed by the same terms and conditions. The court erred 
in distinguishing 500 shares from the remaining 11,445 and 
ordering return of the 500 shares to Plainti|ff. The order should 
be reversed and all 11,945 shares ordered returned to Rocky 
Mountain. 
Defendant did not, in any respect, prevent Plaintiff's 
performance under the consulting arrangement. The court's 
finding, in that regard, has ample support in the record. 
To assume Plaintiff could have performed under the 
consulting arrangement without any parameters establishing just 
what would amount to "performance" is entirely too speculative. 
Again, the court's finding, in that regard, has ample support in 
the record. 
Through this appeal Rocky Mountain geeks an order of this 
court reversing the trial court's finding 0f wrongful termination 
on the grounds the consulting arrangement between Smith and Rocky 
Mountain was not subject to wrongful termination as a matter of 
law or was terminated with just cause. In addition, Rocky 
Mountain seeks an order reversing the trial court's award of 
damages for the reasons outlined herein. Rocky Mountain also 
seeks an order requiring return to it of the 500 shares of stock 
distinguished by the trial court. Finally, Rocky Mountain seeks 
an order affirming the remaining portion$ of the trial court's 
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ruling. 
Respectfully submitted this 
December, 1987 
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